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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial and appellate courts err in holding 
appellants Gardner and Hernandez personally liable on the con-
tract between Foreign Auto Works, Inc., Poggio and Dinero Ser-
vices, Inc., a corporation, without any evidence that Dinero was 
Hernandez and Gardner's alter ego? 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
This Petition seeks review of the Utah Court of 
Appeals' Opinion (for publication) dated January 2, 1990 (herein-
after "Opinion"). 
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann^ S 78-2-2(3)(a) and Rule 42 of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. This Petition has been timely filed under 
Rule 45 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court in that the Court 
of Appeals' Opinion was issued on January 2, 1990, appellants 
Gardner and Hernandez filed a Petition for Rehearing on January 
16, 1990, pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, and that petition was denied by the Court of Appeals 
on January 29, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The disputes giving rise to this appeal all related to 
the purchase and sale in 1979-80 of a Mazda and Fiat dealership 
located in Orem, Utah. At that time, the subject business, For-
eign Auto Works, was a corporation owned entirely by plaintiffs 
Poggiof Ringwood and Francis. However, Poggio had a contract to 
purchase Ringwood's interest, and subsequently did purchase 
Francis1 interest, in the company. Because of a number of dis-
putes that arose, the sale transaction involved the execution of 
four separate and distinct contractual agreements, each of which 
was intended to supersede the preceding ones, over a period of 
several months. 
Plaintiff Ringwood originally sued Poggio, Francis and 
Foreign Auto Works in the Fourth District Court for Utah County 
on the promissory note that had been given in connection with the 
purchase of Ringwood's shares in Foreign Auto Works. That action 
was dismissed on the basis that the note had been superseded by a 
subsequent contract covering the same sale. The ruling in that 
case was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in Ringwood v. For-
eign Auto Works, Inc. 671 P.2d 182 (Utah 1983). Ringwood then 
filed another action in Fourth District Court, against Poggio, 
Francis and Foreign Auto Works, on the contract. Hernandez and 
Gardner were subsequently added as defendants, on the basis that 
Ringwood was a third-party beneficiary of the first contractual 
agreement between them and Poggio. 
Poggio sued Hernandez and Gardner in a separate action, 
attempting to enforce the terms of a November, 1979 contract, 
which included a provision that Hernandez and Gardner assumed 
Poggio's obligation to Ringwood. Poggio amended his Complaint, 
following a Motion to Dismiss by Hernandez and Gardner, to sue 
Hernandez and Gardner on the parties' second contract, and 
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claimed that two subsequent contracts for the sale of the same 
business to Dinero Services, Inc., entered in February and April, 
1980, were invalid because of duress and lack of consideration. 
The Poggio and Ringwood actions were then consolidated. 
Both actions were tried to the court beginning on Sep-
tember 10, 1986. During trial, Poggio's counsel for the first 
time made an oral motion to assert a claim against Hernandez and 
Gardner for failure to pay under the fourth and final contract, 
dated April, 1980, which was actually between Foreign Auto Works, 
Inc., Poggio and Dinero Services, Inc. That motion was granted 
by the court over the objections of Hernandez and Gardner's coun-
sel. Over a month later, Poggio amended his Complaint to include 
such a cause of action. Hernandez and Gardner, without waiving 
their claim that they were not parties to that contract, counter-
claimed for overpayment and for attorneys' fees, relying on the 
terms of the same agreement. 
The court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law on November 14, 1986, and final Judgment on June 4, 1987. 
The court ruled against plaintiff Ringwood on his claims against 
Hernandez and Gardner, finding that the first contract, upon 
which Ringwood relied, had been superseded. The court found in 
favor of Ringwood on his claims against Poggio, Francis and For-
eign Auto Works, finding that those parties had failed to pay on 
their contract to purchase Ringwood's stock. The court ruled 
against Hernandez and Gardner on their counterclaim against 
Poggio, and partially in favor of Poggio on his claim against 
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Hernandez and Gardner under the April, 1980 agreement. With 
respect to Poggio's earlier claims, the court found the April, 
1980 agreement to be the operative one. 
All parties moved for reconsideration of various 
aspects of the judgment, and all post-judgment motions were 
denied by the court on August 3, 1987. Each of the parties sepa-
rately appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which transferred all 
three appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals. All three appeals 
were then consolidated by the Court of Appeals, which issued its 
Opinion, affirming in part and reversing in part the trial court, 
on January 2, 1990. By that Opinion, all issues on appeal were 
affirmed, with the exception of the judgment obtained by Ringwood 
against Poggio, which was reversed on the grounds that Ringwood1s 
claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Gardner and 
Hernandez petitioned for rehearing on the issue of their personal 
liability, which petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on 
January 29, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On November 27, 1979, Max Poggio entered into an 
agreement (the "November Agreement") with Hugh Gardner and Tony 
Hernandez in which it was agreed that Gardner Hernandez would 
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purchase all of the outstanding stock of Foreign Auto Works, Inc. 
("FAW") from Poggio. (Ex. 3; Tr. I1 pp. 19-21). 
2. The terms of the November Agreement included a 
payment by Gardner and Hernandez for Poggio1s covenant not to 
compete, as well as a sale to Hernandez and Gardner of certain 
real property located in Orem, Utah. In addition, Hernandez and 
Gardner agreed to assume Poggio's responsibilities to Richard 
Ringwood arising from Poggio1s contract to purchase Ringwood's 
15,000 shares of FAW stock. (Ex. 3, Tr, I. pp. 12-21). 
3. On December 29, 1979, Poggio, Gardner and 
Hernandez executed another contract (the "December Agreement"), 
the terms of which were essentially identical to those of the 
November Agreement, with the exception that the subsequent agree-
ment eliminated the real property purchase. (Ex. 4; Tr. I pp. 
22-26). 
4. On February 8, 1980, FAW and Dinero Services, Inc. 
("Dinero"), a corporation, the stock in which was owned by 
Gardner and Hernandez, executed another agreement (the "February 
Agreement"). The February Agreement changed the terms of the 
1
 Throughout this brief, references will be made to the multi-
ple volumes of transcript from the trial court proceedings. "Tr. 
I" refers to that portion of the transcript designated as "Tran-
script of September 10, 1986 Trial Proceedings." Similarly, "Tr. 
II: refers to the Transcript of October 15, 1986 Trial Proceed-
ings," "Tr. Ill" to "Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, Compris-
ing the Testimony of the Witness Hugh Gardner," "Tr. IV" to 
"Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, Comprising the Testimony of 
the Witness Massimo C. Poggio," and "Tr. V" to "Transcript of 
October 16, 1986 Trial Proceedings." "Ex. 3" refers to Exhibit 3 
at trial. Other trial exhibits will be referenced similarly. 
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contract to eliminate the purchase of FAW stock, and provided 
instead for purchase of essentially all of the company's assets, 
Gardner and Hernandez were not named as parties to the February 
Agreement. (Ex. 5; Tr. I pp. 94-95). 
5. The February Agreement eliminated any assumption 
of Poggio's outstanding liability to Ringwood. (Ex. 5). 
6. On April 14, 1980, Poggio, FAW and Dinero executed 
a final agreement (the "April Agreement11) with respect to the 
sale and purchase of the assets of FAW. Again, Gardner and 
2 
Hernandez were not named parties. (Ex. 9,10; Tr. I pp. 49-50.) 
7. Under the April Agreement, Dinero did not agree to 
purchase any FAW stock, and did not agree to assume any liability 
for Poggio's debt to Ringwood. (Ex. 9, 10). 
8. On November 30, 1983, Poggio sued Hernandez and 
Gardner for breach of the November Agreement. Dinero was not 
named as a party. (Complaint). 
9. On January 26, 1984, following defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss, Poggio amended his Complaint to eliminate the claims 
under the November Agreement, and to allege instead of a cause of 
2
 The April Agreement was submitted to the trial court in two 
forms. Ex. 9 was a copy of the agreement from Poggio's records, 
and Ex. 10 was a copy from Dinero's records. Exhibits 9 and 10 
differ in only two material respects. Ex. 9 contains an unfilled 
blank at 11 3(a), whereas Ex. 10 contains the figure $75,076.79 in 
that space, which figure was initiated by Poggio. (Tr. I p. 50.) 
In addition, there were different promissory notes attaches as 
"Exhibit 4" to each agreement. Ex. 9's note was in the amount of 
$80,000 and Exhibit 10's note was in the amount of $30,583.02. 
(Tr. I pp. 49-58.) The court found that the evidence did not 
support the inclusion of either note as a part of the April 
Agreement. (Findings of Fact H 85(e).) 
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action under the December Agreement. Again, Dinero was not 
named. (Amended Complaint). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, this Court may grant review of a Court of Appeals' deci-
sion by writ of certiorari "only when there are special and 
important reasons therefor." Of the character of reasons set 
forth in Rule 43 upon which these appellants rely, is the 
following: 
• • • 
(3) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision that has so 
far departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court 
as to call for an exercise of this court's 
power of supervision; 
• « • 
Appellants assert that the Court of Appeals in this matter, by 
accepting "findings" of the trial court that were made without 
presentation of any evidence at trial, has sanctioned such a 
departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings as to call for the exercise of this Court's power of 
supervision. 
Moreover, while the Court of Appeals applied the cor-
rect standard for piercing of the corporate veil in this State, 
its application of that standard to the trial court's "findings" 
evidences a total lack of reasoned analysis, even assuming, 
arguendo, that the trial court could legitimately make such 
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findings without presentation of evidence. Indeed, the findings 
upon which the Court of Appeals relied in affirming the trial 
court's decision to pierce the corporate veil in this case in no 
way satisfied the standard for piercing the corporate veil as it 
is described by the Court of Appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
HERNANDEZ AND GARDNER WERE NOT PARTIES TO THE 
APRIL AGREEMENT, AND CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE 
FOR A BREACH OF ITS TERMS ABSENT A SHOWING 
THAT DINERO SERVICES, INC. WAS IN FACT THEIR 
ALTER EGO. 
There is no dispute that the parties to the April 
Agreement, which the trial court found to be the controlling 
agreement, were Dinero, FAW and Max Poggio. There is likewise no 
dispute that Dinero is, and was at the time of the agreement, a 
valid Utah corporation, in which Gardner and Hernandez are share-
holders. (Tr. II p. 51; Tr. Ill pp. 2-3). Finally, there is no 
dispute that four separate contracts were executed in connection 
with the purchase and sale of FAW and that each of those agree-
ments contain different terms, including different named parties. 
Thus, Dinero is the named buyer in the last two agreements and 
Gardner and Hernandez are not. Why this change in parties was 
made was never the subject of evidence at trial. 
In this case, both the Court of Appeals and the trial 
court found that the April Agreement was a valid contract that 
superseded all prior agreements for the purchase and sale of FAW. 
Neither Hernandez nor Gardner is a party to the April Agreement 
in an individual capacity, and there was no evidence presented at 
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trial that would in any way support a finding that Dinero was 
3 
their alter ego. 
In its Opinion on this issue, the Court of Appeals rec-
ognized the standard applicable to attempts to hold individuals 
liable for the obligations of corporations, which is as follows: 
"Ordinarily, a corporation is regarded as a 
separate and distinct legal entity from its 
stockholders." This is true whether the cor-
poration has many stockholders or only one. 
Consequently, the corporate veil which pro-
tects stockholders from individual liability 
will only be pierced reluctantly and 
cautiously. 
To disregard the corporate entity under the 
equitable alter ego doctrine, two circum-
stances must be shown: (1) such a unity of 
interest and ownership that the separate per-
sonalities of the corporation and the indi-
vidual no longer exist, but the corporation 
is, instead, the alter ego of one or a few 
individuals; and (2) if observed, the corpo-
rate form would sanction a fraud, promote 
injustice, or result in an inequity. 
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Opinion 
at 14. See also# Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
3 The trial court apparently misperceived the arguments made 
in connection with Hernandez and Gardner's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which were that the February and April Agreements 
superceded the December Agreement since they involved the same 
subject matter and essentially the same parties. Significantly, 
this argument did not involve any concession by Gardner or 
Hernandez that use of the corporate entity in the latter agree-
ments was invalid, or that they could be held liable as individu-
als under the April Agreement. Nor is it evidence of an "intent" 
that Gardner and Hernandez would be personally liable under an 
agreement to which they were not parties. It certainly is not 
evidence sufficient to satisfy the Colman test. 
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Poggio presented no evidence that would support a find-
ing that the two-part test described in Colman had been satis-
fied. In fact, Poggio never even asserted that Dinero was the 
alter ego of Hernandez and Gardner. Nor did the trial court make 
any findings consistent with Colman. Instead, the court simply 
held, in conclusory fashion, that "Dinero Services, Inc. was not 
intended by the parties to be the contracting party, but that 
Gardner and Hernandez were the actual buyers [under the April 
Agreement] and were obligated as such." (Conclusions of Law f 
3(a)). Significantly, this conclusion was reached by the court 
prior to any evidence having been presented, the court stating at 
the beginning of the trial as follows: 
As I understand the position, I don't think I 
could come to any other conclusion, that they 
expected they were all dealing with each 
other as individuals. That's the way they 
started out. Even though they talked about 
the corporate structures, everyone felt that 
they were dealing with each other. And, 
that's the position that I've taken with 
respect to that. 
(Tr. 1 pp. 6-7). 
Indeed, the Court of Appeals even recognized that this 
was the case, stating, "At the beginning of trial, the court 
stated that Gardner and Hernandez were personally liable under 
the April agreement and the trial proceeded with that ruling in 
place." Opinion at 14 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals' 
Opinion goes on to cite the "findings" of the trial court, noting 
that those findings were "supported by the evidence." Id. How-
ever, there was no evidence presented at trial on this issue, nor 
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were Gardner and Hernandez given any opportunity to present evi-
dence to the contrary. 
The trial court's conclusion, based apparently upon 
arguments on the issue of whether the later agreements at issue 
in fact superseded the prior two, is different from, and falls 
far short of, what is necessary to hold Gardner and Hernandez 
individually liable for the contractual obligations of Dinero. 
It was both palpably unfair, and in conflict with clear Utah law, 
for the court to ignore the corporate form without even a scin-
tilla of evidence presented that such action was justified. 
There was no evidence of a "unity of interest" sufficient to 
eliminate the corporation's separate personality, nor was there 
any evidence that recognition of the corporate entity would in 
any way "sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or result in an 
inequity." These findings are necessary to justify individual 
liability under the facts that were shown in this case. The 
trial court's conclusory finding of such liability flies in the 
face of this State's policy of recognizing the validity of the 
corporate form except under unusual and limited circumstances. 
The decision to hold Gardner and Hernandez individually liable 
under the April Agreement was therefore in error. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's finding of individual liability on 
the part of appellants Gardner and Hernandez was not based upon 
evidence of record and was therefore in error. The Court of 
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Appeals' Opinion affirming the trial court's finding on that 
issue was likewise in error and should be reversed by this Court. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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Richard W. Ringwood, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc. and 
Howard R. Francis, Massimo C. 
Poggio, Rebecca Jane Poggio, 
Anthony Hernandez and Hugh 
Gardner, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
Massimo "Max" Poggio and 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Hugh Gardner and Anthony R. 
Hernandez, 
Defendants. 
Richard W. Ringwood, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc. et 
al., 
Defendants and Appellants 
Massimo "Max* Poggio and 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
Hugh Gardner and Anthony R. 
Hernandez, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
Richard W. Ringwood, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc. et 
al., 
Defendants and Respondents 
Massimo "Max" Poggio and 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Hugh Gardner and Anthony R. 
Hernandez, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 870540-CA 
Case No. 870541-CA 
Case No. 870544-CA 
Fourth District/ Utah County 
The Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen 
Attorneys: Dallas H. Young, Jr., Jerry Reynolds/ Provo, for 
Appellant and Respondent Ringwood 
Val R. Antczak/ Julia C. Attwood/ Salt Lake City, 
for Appellants and Respondents Gardner & 
Hernandez 
Robert C. Fillerup, Orem/ for Appellant and 
Respondent Francis 
Lynn C. Harris, Jeril B. Wilson, Provo, for 
Appellants and Respondents Poggio and Foreign 
Auto Works 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orme. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
This appeal arises from the sale of Foreign Auto Works, 
Inc. (FAW), an auto sales and service business. Richard W. 
Ringwood (Ringwood), Howard R. Francis (Francis), and Rebecca 
Jane and Massimo "Max* Poggio (Poggio) were the owners of all 
the issued FAW stock. Ringwood agreed to sell his stock to 
Poggio and Francis. Poggio subsequently bought Francis's stock 
and sold FAW to Hugh Gardner (Gardner) and Anthony R. Hernandez 
(Hernandez). Ringwood brought an action against Francis and 
Poggio for breach of contract and against Hernandez and 
Gardner, claiming to be a third party beneficiary of their 
contract with Poggio. Poggio filed a separate action for 
breach of contract against Gardner and Hernandez. The two 
actions were consolidated and tried together. The court found 
Francis and Poggio liable for breach of their agreement with 
Ringwood, but dismissed Ringwood's claim against Hernandez and 
Gardner. The court also rendered judgment for Poggio against 
Gardner and Hernandez. Hernandez and Gardner's counterclaim 
against Poggio and FAW was dismissed with prejudice. All 
parties appealed. 
FACTS 
Ringwood, Francis, and Poggio were owners of all the FAW 
issued stock, 50,000 shares. FAW was engaged in operating 
O T r t C >t A • C A t / r i 
Mazda and Fiat franchises and selling parts for and repairing 
Mazdas and Fiats. 
In October 1978, the owners negotiated a sale of Ringwood's 
15,000 shares to Francis and Poggio. This agreement was 
formalized in a promissory note obligating FAW, Poggio, and 
Francis to pay Ringwood $100,000 at a rate of at least $20,000 
per year with interest to accrue at 10.5% annually. On 
November 8, 1978, FAW, Ringwood, Francis, and Poggio executed a 
new agreement that included most of the same terras as in the 
promissory note, but also contained a merger provision. This 
agreement prohibited Francis and Poggio from selling the stock 
or assets of FAW without Ringwood*s prior written approval. By 
October 1979, Francis and Poggio were delinquent in their 
payments to Ringwood. Poggio then purchased all of Francis's 
shares and became the sole owner. 
On November 27, 1979, Poggio contracted to sell the FAW 
stock to Gardner and Hernandez. The same parties executed a 
new agreement on December 29, 1979, which excluded the sale of 
FAW's real property. Both agreements included provisions for 
full payment to Ringwood and specified 10.5% per annum interest 
on amounts to be paid to Poggio. 
On February 8, 1980, a new agreement was again executed 
changing the transaction from a sale of FAW stock to a sale of 
FAW's assets. No interest rate on the purchase price was 
specified. Dinero Services, Inc«, (Dinero) a corporation 
formed and owned by Hernandez and Gardner, was designated as 
the sole buyer. This agreement did not contain any provision 
for the buyer to assume Poggio*s obligation to Ringwood. 
In April 1980, Poggio and Dinero Services, Inc. executed 
their final agreement. This agreement was executed because a 
condition precedent in the February contract had not occurred 
and a dispute had arisen over the assets* value* It contained 
an indemnity agreement that required Poggio to indemnify the 
-seller* [sic] for any amounts Dinero might be required to pay 
Ringwood, including attorney fees. Again, no interest rate was 
set forth. 
Ringwood had filed a prior lawsuit on January 29, 1980, 
claiming Poggio and Francis had breached the October 1978 
promissory note. Because Ringwood did not base his claim on 
the November 8 agreement, which the court found controlling, 
the court dismissed Ringwood's claim with prejudice. This 
870540/541/544-CA i 
decision was affirmed in Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 
671 P.2d 182 (Utah 1983), 
Ringwood filed the complaint leading to this appeal on 
February 4, 1985, basing his claim against Poggio and Francis 
on the November 8 agreement* Ringwood included Gardner and 
Hernandez as defendants, claiming he was a third party 
beneficiary of their agreement with Poggio and that he was 
damaged by their breach of that agreement. Ringwood claimed 
Poggio and Francis failed to make payments required by the 
November agreement; that they breached the agreement by selling 
FAW's assets; and that they acted with malicious intent to 
deprive Ringwood of his interests. 
Poggio then filed a complaint against Gardner and Hernandez 
for breach of their November 27, 1979 agreement. After the 
court found the April 1980 agreement was controlling, Poggio 
amended his complaint, basing his claims on the April agreement. 
The court found that res judicata did not bar Ringwood and 
that Poggio and Francis were liable to Ringwood for breach, but 
that there was no malicious intent. The court also awarded 
Poggio judgment against Hernandez and Gardner personally, 
rather than against Dinero, with interest to accrue at the 
legal rate, finding that the controlling contract did not 
specify an interest rate. The court allocated expense and 
income damages from April 14, 1980, the date of the closing, 
instead of February, when Hernandez and Gardner took possession 
Of FAW. 
With respect to Ringwoodfs claims against Gardner and 
Hernandez, the court found Ringwood was not a third party 
beneficiary but only an incidental beneficiary under the 
controlling agreement, and dismissed the claim with prejudice. 
The trial court also found there was insufficient evidence to 
find that Poggio or FAW was insolvent when the contract with 
Hernandez and Gardner was entered into. 
Ringwood appeals the court's finding that he is not a third 
party beneficiary. He argues further that the April 14 
agreement could not release Gardner and Hernandez from their 
obligation to him. 
Poggio appeals the court's ruling that Ringwood's claim was 
not barred by res judicata and that interest would accrue on 
his judgment against Gardner and Hernandez at the legal rate. 
Also, with respect to the court's finding on allocation of 
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income and expense damages, Poggio argues he should be liable 
for those damages only to February 8, 1980/ when Gardner and 
Hernadez took control of FAW, not April 14, 1980/ the closing 
date specified in the last agreement. 
Gardner and Hernandez claim the court erred in finding that 
Poggio's amended complaint relates back to his original 
complaint/ thus allowing Poggio to bring a claim six years 
after the initial breach on August 8/ 1980/ after expiration of 
the applicable statute of limitations. 
The court denied Gardner and Hernandez attorney fees 
because there was no showing of the necessity or reasonableness 
of the fees requested. Gardner and Hernandez claim on appeal 
that a showing of reasonableness is unnecessary under an 
indemnity agreement. 
RINGWOOD'S CLAIMS 
Ringwood raises two arguments on appeal. First/ he claims 
the court erred in finding he was not a third party 
beneficiary# but only an incidental beneficiary of the contract 
between Poggio and Gardner and Hernandez. Second, in related 
arguments, Ringwood urges that Poggio1s release of Gardner and 
Hernandez from their obligation to pay him was ineffective 
because (1) he had vested rights by virtue of Gardner and 
Hernandez's exercise of control over FAW, (2) Poggio was 
insolvent at the time of the release/ and (3) there was not 
fair consideration for the April agreement. 
Third Party Beneficiary 
The court found that Ringwood was an intended third party 
beneficiary under the first two contracts between Poggio and 
Gardner and Hernandez/ but that Ringwood did not rely upon/ 
assent to# nor file an action based on either of those 
contracts prior to the time they were superceded by the 
February and April 1980 agreements. The court further found 
that Ringwood was intended to be an incidental beneficiary only 
of the February 8/ 1980 and April 14/ 1980 agreements. 
"Generally/ the rights of a third-party beneficiary are 
determined by the intentions of the parties to the subject 
contract." Tracv Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 
1314/ 1315 (Utah 1982). Moreover/ *[f]or a third-party 
beneficiary to have a right to enforce a right, the intention 
of the contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct 
nm^dn/^Ai /^44-ra c 
benefit upon the third party must be clear.- Hansen v. Green 
River Group, 748 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting 
Rio Alaom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 506 (Utah 1980)). 
An incidental beneficiary is defined as a Hperson who will be 
benefited by the performance of a contract in which he is not a 
promisee, but whose relation to the contracting parties is such 
that the courts will not recognize any legal right in him.-
Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 21 Utah 2d 418, 446 P.2d 414, 415 
(1968). 
In this case, the contracts of November and December 
expressly obligated Gardner and Hernandez to assume Poggio*s 
obligation to Ringwood. However, these agreements were 
superceded by the February agreement and ultimately by the 
April agreement, both of which lacked any requirement that 
Gardner and Hernandez assume the obligation to Ringwood, but 
explicitly obligated Poggio to satisfy the obligation. Because 
Gardner and Hernandez did not expressly assume the obligation 
as they had in the earlier agreements, and because Poggio 
expressly agreed to satisfy his obligation to Ringwood, it is 
clear that the parties no longer intended Ringwood as a third 
party beneficiary, Gardner and Hernandez have cited the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts for the proposition that 
parties may modify duties to a third party beneficiary under 
some circumstances, as follows: 
(1) Discharge or modification of a 
duty to an intended beneficiary by conduct 
of the promisee or by a subsequent 
agreement between promisor and promisee is 
ineffective if a term of the promise 
creating the duty so provides. 
(2) In the absence of such a term, the 
promisor and promisee retain power to 
discharge or modify the duty by subsequent 
agreement. 
(3) Such a power terminates when the 
beneficiary, before he receives 
notification of the discharge or 
modification, materially changes his 
position in justifiable reliance on the 
promise or brings suit on it or manifests 
assent to it at the request of the 
promisor or promisee. 
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 311 (1981) (emphasis 
added). Although no Utah cases have expressly adopted this 
language, we find it applicable to the facts of this case. As 
found by the trial court, Ringwood did not rely upon nor change 
his position because of the rights as a third party beneficiary 
afforded him in the first two contracts, nor did he file an 
action based on those rights. Therefore, the parties were free 
to terminate Ringwood's rights in the later, superceding 
contracts. The April agreement clearly does not give Ringwood 
third party beneficiary status. As a result, the trial court 
did not err in concluding Ringwood was not a third party 
beneficiary to the April agreement. 
Fraudulent Release 
Ringwood also argues that the rescission of his rights 
under the earlier agreements was fraudulent and, therefore/ 
invalid, because Poggio did not receive fair consideration for 
the release and because Poggio was insolvent. To support his 
contention, Ringwood primarily relies on the Second Restatement 
on Contracts, which states, Ma promise for the benefit of a 
creditor of the promisee is an asset of the promisee. A 
release of the promisor may be a fraud on the beneficiary or on 
other creditors of the promisee if the promisee is insolvent 
and the release is made without fair consideration . . . ." 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 311 comment i (1981). 
The court's findings state that there was insufficient 
evidence to find that either Poggio or FAW was insolvent. The 
court also found that there was fair consideration for the 
April 1980 agreement. We review the trial court1s findings in 
accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), and will not reverse 
unless the findings are clearly erroneous. 
Evidence was presented as to Poggio's debts, including tax 
debts and the amounts owed to Ringwood. However, no evidence 
was admitted concerning the value of FAW, retained by Poggio 
under the agreements, nor of the Fiat franchise, which he 
retained until 1982. Poggio also testified that he owned a 
painting, valued in excess of $100,000. No competent evidence 
was presented to invalidate that valuation. We find sufficient 
evidence to support the court's finding that Poggio's 
insolvency was not established. Similarly, the court's finding 
of fair consideration for the April 1980 agreement is supported 
by Poggio's testimony regarding amounts he was to receive under 
the agreement and as reflected in the agreement itself. 
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Finally, Ringwood cites Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co., 95 
Utah 490, 80 P.2d 471 (1938) to support his novel theory that 
he had a vested third party interest because of Gardner and 
Hernandez's exercise of dominion and control over FAW's 
assets. Bracklein, however, concerns a grantee of mortgaged 
property who was in privity of contract with the mortgagee 
through an assumption clause. Ringwood was not in privity with 
Gardner and Hernandez and, therefore, Bracklein is 
inapplicable. Also, Gardner and Hernandez took possession of 
FAW after the February agreement was executed and after 
Ringwood's third party beneficiary rights had been 
extinguished. Therefore, Ringwood is not restored to third 
party rights by use of this theory. 
POGGIO'S CLAIMS 
On appeal, Poggio claims that the trial court erred (1) by 
concluding that Ringwood*s claims against him under the 
November 1978 agreement were not barred by res judicata; (2) in 
ruling that the legal rate of interest applied to the amount 
owed him by Gardner and Hernandez; and (3) allocating costs and 
expenses from the date of closing rather than from when Gardner 
and Hernandez took over FAW„ 
Res Judicata 
Poggio claims the court incorrectly concluded that the 
doctrine of res judicata did not operate to preclude Ringwood's 
second complaint against him. Prior to analyzing the 
applicability of res judicata, however, we consider an 
evidentiary question raised by Ringwood. Ringwood asserts that 
there was no evidentiary basis for a determination that res 
judicata barred his action, because no evidence was offered or 
admitted as to the prior proceeding. We have examined the 
record, and determined that there are no exhibits in the trial 
court proceedings consisting of records of the prior 
litigation, nor were any requests for judicial notice of those 
proceedings made on the record. 
Ringwood cites the case of Parrish v. Lavton Citv Corp., 
542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975) as supporting his position. In 
Parrish, defendant claimed that plaintiffs action was barred 
by res judicata because a prior similar action had been 
dismissed. The trial court's grant of summary judgment to 
defendant was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court, stating that 
"[a] survey of the record reveals that defendant never 
submitted a copy of the pleadings and judgment" from the prior 
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action. Id., at 1087. The court found that M[s]ince the record 
of the prior action was not before the trial court/ there is no 
basis to sustain the determination that plaintiff's claim was 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.- Id. 
Application of Parrish was addressed by this court in 
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988)# cert, denied, 769 P.2d 819 (Utah 1988). In a 
prior action, Trimble had sued Fitzgerald/ a buyer# for a real 
estate commission. The trial court found against him and the 
supreme court affirmed the decision. Trimble then brought a 
second action for the same commission against Monte Vista 
Ranch/ seller of the property/ which raised the defense of res 
judicata. The trial court dismissed the action on the basis of 
res judicata and Trimble appealed. On appeal/ Trimble, relying 
on Parrish, asked for reversal because the trial court did not 
have before it the records of the prior proceeding/ but only 
the supreme court decision, which was attached to a memorandum 
in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment. The 
Trimble court found Parrish distinguishable, noting that in 
Parrish, the trial court had no record at all of the prior 
proceeding, and thus Hhad absolutely no basis for determining 
the res judicata issue.- I&. at 455. The court further found 
that Trimble had consented to the trial court's reliance on the 
opinion and that 
once Monte Vista submitted to the district 
court a copy of the Supreme Court opinion, 
which on its face showed that the key 
issue had been litigated and decided, the 
burden shifted to Trimble, if it believed 
more than the opinion was needed to make a 
fully informed decision, to produce the 
record of the prior proceeding/ urge the 
court to take judicial notice of it/ or 
otherwise show that the opinion should not 
be taken at face value. 
I&. Trimble/ however/ had not taken any of those actions but 
had merely argued the meaning of the opinion in the prior 
action. Id. As a result/ this court held that Trimble 
consented to the trial court's use of the opinion alone as a 
basis for its ruling. In addition, the trial court was able to 
infer from the opinion what had been adjudicated in the prior 
action and conclude that the present action was barred by 
collateral estoppel. Id. 
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In this case, from our reading of the record, it is not 
clear whether or not the trial court actually examined the 
trial court proceedings in the former action,1 It is clear, 
however, that the trial court examined the supreme court 
opinion. Not only was it referred to in some detail in 
memoranda and motions of counsel, but was also detailed in the 
court's rulings, which demonstrate the court's familiarity with 
the opinion. Throughout the course of the trial court 
proceedings, counsel and the court referred to and argued the 
meaning of the supreme court opinion in the context of the res 
judicata claim. At no point did Ringwood object to reliance on 
the opinion or move for admission of the former action's trial 
court proceedings. Therefore, as in Trimble, there was no 
error in utilizing the opinion only to determine the 
applicability of res judicata. 
The next question is whether there needed to be explicit 
admission of the opinion into evidence or taking of judicial 
notice.2 Judicial notice serves as a substitute for the 
taking of evidence. 29 Am. Jur.2d Evidence § 14 (1967). 
Therefore, since the opinion was not admitted into evidence, it 
is sufficient if judicial notice was taken. Pursuant to Utah 
R. Evid. 201(c), the court has discretion to take judicial 
notice without request by counsel. In this case, the trial 
court reserved ruling on the res judicata issue until after the 
supreme court opinion was issued. Thereafter, it referred to 
the opinion in detail when rendering its decision and the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law entered include 
particulars from the opinion. It is clear that the trial court 
had carefully read the opinion and ruled on the res judicata 
issue on the basis of its interpretation of the opinion, with 
no objection by the parties. We, therefore, conclude that the 
court took judicial notice of the opinion and utilized the 
1. There are, however, indications that the court may have 
examined the proceedings. For example, the court said it 
wanted to look at the file of the former action when the 
supreme court was through with it, and at one point, counsel 
for Poggio stated he had the summons and complaint from the 
former action. 
2. Trimble does not address this question, although it appears 
that the supreme court opinion was neither admitted as evidence 
nor afforded official judicial notice on the record. 
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opinion as the evidentiary basis for its decision on the issue 
of res judicata.3 
We now turn to the question of whether the trial court 
correctly concluded that Ringwood's claim under the November 8 
agreement against Poggio was not barred by res judicata. Claim 
preclusion is a branch of the doctrine of res judicata which 
has three requirements for its application: 
First/ both cases must involve the same 
parties or their privies. Second/ the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must 
have been presented in the first suit or 
must be one that could and should have 
been raised in the first action. Third/ 
the first suit must have resulted in a 
final judgment on the merits, 
Madsen v. Borthwick, 769 P.2d 245/ 247 (Utah 1988),. Therefore, 
the result in the prior action-constitutes the full relief 
available to the parties on the same claim or cause of action. 
Trimble, 758 P.2d at 453. In contrast to the claim preclusion 
branch of res judicata, issue preclusion, or collateral 
estoppel, requires that the issue in question was competently, 
fully, and fairly litigated in the earlier action. Copper 
State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) . Claim preclusion applicability/ however# requires that 
the claim/ even though not decided in the prior action, could 
and should have been litigated/ but was not raised by any of 
the parties. See Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 
1981). This -reflects the expectation that parties who are 
given the capacity to present their 'entire controversies' 
shall in fact do so." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 
comment a (1982). 
The findings of the trial court in this case indicate that/ 
in the prior action, the trial court ruled that the October 
promissory note merged into the November 8 agreement and that 
ruling was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. The trial court 
herein concluded that the prior decision was "not a decision on 
3. We note, however, as does Trimble, that it would be 
preferable for counsel to have provided a copy of the trial 
court proceedings and the supreme court opinion, and either had 
them admitted as exhibits or requested judicial notice. 
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the merits of Ringwood's claims for the sale of his stock and 
such decision is not res judicata so as to preclude Ringwood 
from pursuing claims under the Agreement oE November 8, 1979." 
We do not defer to the trial court's conclusions of law, and in 
this case, find that the court erred in concluding that res 
judicata did not bar Ringwood's claim against Poggio. Both the 
October promissory note and the November agreement concerned 
Poggio's purchase of Ringwoodfs stock.4 The court in the 
prior action determined that the October note was nullified by 
merger into the November agreement so that Ringwood could not 
assert a claim under the October note. Since Ringwood failed 
to assert a claim under the November agreement either initially 
or by amendment to his complaint, the case was properly 
dismissed. Obviously, a claim by Ringwood under the November 
agreement could have been decided in the prior action, as the 
agreement was extant and was in default. The only reason it 
was not decided was because Ringwood failed to raise the 
claim. The trial court apparently held that res judicata did 
not apply because Ringwood's claim for payment for his stock 
under the November agreement was not litigated. However, the 
reason the claim was not litigated was solely because of 
Ringwood's failure to assert the claim. The other requirements 
of res judicata are also met, as the parties are the same and 
the first action resulted in a final judgment on the 
merits.5 Therefore, we find that res judicata bars 
Ringwood's claims against Poggio and Francis, and reverse the 
judgment granted Ringwood. 
Legal Rate of Interest 
Poggio appeals the court's application of the then legal 
rate of interest, 6%, to the balance of the purchase price owed 
by Gardner and Hernandez. Poggio admits that the April 
agreement is silent on the interest rate, but contends, 
4. The supreme court opinion states: "In 1978, Mr. Ringwood 
and FAW agreed with the defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Poggio and Mr. 
Francis, that the defendants would purchase Ringwood's shares 
for $100,000, and the defendants signed a promissory note in 
October, 1978 for that amount. Subsequently, on November 8, 
1978 the parties entered into a written agreement for the sale 
and purchase of the stock." Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, 
Inc., 671 P.2d 182, 182 (Utah 1983). 
5. The fact that the prior action was dismissed with prejudice 
does not nullify res judicata application, as such constitutes 
litigation on the merits. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Steiner v. 
State, 27 Utah 2d 284, 495 P-2d 809 (1972). 
however, the interest rate should be inferred to be 10.5% as 
was specified in the previous agreements that were superceded. 
Poggio presented no evidence at trial of an intent to 
incorporate a 10.5% interest rate into the April agreement. 
The court found that the parties intended the April agreement 
to supercede and replace all prior agreements. We defer to the 
trial court's findings as to the parties* intentions. 
Seashores Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d 645, 647 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). The court's finding is supported by substantial 
evidence. Furthermore/ the prior agreements merged into the 
April agreement which clearly does not specify an interest 
rate. Utah law provides that the legal rate is applicable in 
instances where the parties have not agreed on a specified 
rate. Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (1986). We, therefore, conclude 
that the court did not err in awarding interest at the legal 
rate on Poggiofs judgment against Gardner and Hernandez. 
Allocation of Income and Expense Liability 
Lastly, Poggio appeals the trial court's allocation of 
income and expense damages as of the date of closing rather 
than the earlier date when Gardner and Hernandez took 
possession of FAW. This issue was not raised in the trial 
court and, hence, cannot be considered for the first time on 
appeal. Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320, 1322-23 (Utah 1982); 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
GARDNER AND HERNANDEZ'S CLAIMS 
Gardner and Hernandez contend the trial court erred (1) by 
finding them personally liable under the April agreement; (2) 
in ruling that Poggio*s amended complaint related back to his 
original complaint; (3) in its calculation of the amount owed 
by them to Poggio; and (4) in denying them attorney fees. 
Personal Liability 
Gardner and Hernandez appeal the trial court"s conclusion 
that they are personally liable under the April agreement. 
They argue that the court ignored the corporate form without 
finding Dinero was their alter ego and, consequently, 
unjustifiably pierced the corporate veil. 
The corporate form protects shareholders from personal 
liability and will be pierced by the courts with great 
reluctance and caution. Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1987)• In order to disregard the corporate 
entity, 
two circumstances must be shown: (1) such 
a unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation 
and the individual no longer exist, but 
the corporation is, instead, the alter-ego 
of one or a few individuals; and (2) if 
observed, the corporate form would 
sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or 
result in an inequity. 
Id. See also Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 
P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). One of the factors deemed 
significant in determining whether this test has been met is 
the use of the corporation as a facade for operations of the 
dominant stockholder. Colman, 743 P.2d at 786. ^ At the 
beginning of trial, the court stated that Gardner and Hernandez 
were personally liable under the April agreement and the trial 
proceeded with that ruling in place.(( The court found that 
Gardner and Hernandez were the real parties in interest, that 
they were intended as parties to the agreement, and that 
MDinero Services Inc. was not considered by the parties as an 
operative entity as far as the dealings between the parties 
were concerned." These findings are supported by the evidence, 
especially considering the history of transactions in this 
matter, and meet the required legal criteria for piercing the 
corporate veil. Therefore, the court did not err in holding 
Gardner and Hernandez personally liable to Poggio under the 
April agreement. 
Relation Back 
Gardner and Hernandez appeal the court's conclusion that 
Poggio's amendment to the complaint, filed on October 16, 1986, 
relates back to his original complaint, filed on May 3, 1982, 
and was, thus, not barred by the statute of limitations. 
Poggio's last amended complaint was for the purpose of basing 
his claim against Gardner and Hernandez on the April 
agreement. Gardner and Hernandez argue that the earlier 
pleadings did not place them on notice that Poggio would base 
his action for breach of contract on the April agreement. 
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), leave to amend pleadings 
"shall be freely given when justice so requires.- Utah R. Civ. 
P. 15(c) states, M[w]henever the claim or defense asserted in 
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the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence, set forth or attempted to be set forth in the 
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of 
the original pleading.- Relation back is allowed under the 
rules even if a statute of limitations has run during the 
intervening time. Mevers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879 
(Utah 1981). In considering motions to amend pleadings, 
primary considerations are whether parties have adequate notice 
to meet new issues and whether any party receives an unfair 
advantage or disadvantage. Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 
(Utah 1981). See also Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 761 P.2d 
581, 587 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In this case, Poggio's claim in his amended complaint is 
based on essentially the same transaction as was the original 
complaint: the purchase of FAW and/or its assets by Gardner 
and Hernandez and their alleged failure to perform under the 
operative contract between the parties. In addition, Gardner 
and Hernandez asserted repeatedly in the trial court 
proceedings, that the agreements under which Poggio had 
previously sought to recover had been superceded and filed a 
memorandum in support of a motion for partial summary judgment 
against Poggio, arguing the April agreement was controlling. 
This memorandum was filed three months before Poggio filed his 
amendment. Because the amendment was based on a similar claim 
arising out of the same general transaction, and because 
Gardner and Hernandez were aware, within the period of the 
statute, that the April agreement was superceding, Gardner and 
Hernandez had adequate notice of the claim and were not 
prejudiced by the amendment. The subject matter of the April 
agreement arose from the same basic dealings as the prior 
agreements between the same parties and the amendment alleging 
breach of the April agreement related back to the original 
filing and was not barred by the statute of limitations. 
Therefore, the court did not err in concluding that the 
amendment related back. 
Amount of Liability to Poggio 
Gardner and Hernandez claim the court erred in determining 
the amount owed Poggio. Specifically, they claim the court 
erred in calculating the amount they actually paid under the 
April agreement. Gardner testified that he actually overpaid 
approximately $12,000. To the contrary, Poggio testified that 
there was still an outstanding balance. Based on this 
testimony and other evidence, the court granted judgment to 
870540/541/544-CA 15 
Poggio for $20,330.27, as the balance owed on the purchase price, 
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. . . ." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Particularly, the court's award of 
damages will be affirmed on appeal, Hif there is a reasonable 
basis in evidenceH to support it. Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 
499, 500 (Utah 1976); Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); 
Katzenbach v. State, 735 P.2d 405, 409 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Moreover, M[t]he trial court as a trier of fact is free to assess 
the credibility of the witnesses, and a conflict in evidence 
alone is not grounds for reversal. We will not upset findings, 
so long as they are supported by substantial record evidence." 
Chandler v. Mathews, 734 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah 1987). Although 
evidence of the amount actually paid was conflicting, the trial 
court's finding is based on substantial evidence and is not 
clearly erroneous. 
Attorney Fees 
Finally, Gardner and Hernandez appeal the court's denial of 
attorney fees. The April agreement provided that Poggio would 
indemnify Dinero Hfrom any and all claims and loss . . . 
including attoneys' fees" arising from claims made by Ringwood. 
Gardner's testimony that $6500 in attorney fees had been paid to 
defend against Ringwood*s claims was the sole evidence offered to 
support the claim for pttorney fees. The trial court denied the 
request for fees on the basis that there was no evidence 
presented to show that the fees were reasonable or necessary, or 
the nature of the work done. Gardner and Hernandez argue such 
evidence is unnecessary because the request is made pursuant to 
an indemnity agreement and not an attorney fees clause. To 
support this argument, they cite Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & 
Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059 (Alaska.1978). However, in Heritage, 
the Alaska Supreme Court found attorney fees were recoverable as 
falling within an implied right of indemnification clause, but 
did not hold that there was no requirement of a showing that the 
fees were reasonable. We see no basis for distinguishing a 
request for attorney fees under an indemnity provision from a 
request under an attorney fee provision. MAttorney fees awarded 
pursuant to contract or statute are usually those found by the 
court to be 'reasonable,' unless the statute or contract provides 
otherwise." Canvon Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414, 420 
(Utah 1989). Furthermore, "[i]t is well established that to 
justify a finding of a reasonable attorney's fee, there must be 
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evidence in support of that finding, . . . It is beyond 
dispute that an evidentiary basis is a fundamental requirement 
for establishing an award of attorney fees,- Barnes v. Wood, 
750 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Paul Mueller 
Co. v. Cache Vallev Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 
1982)). The trial court was, therefore, correct in denying the 
request because there was no showing the fees requested were 
reasonable. 
Affirmed in part, and reversed as to the judgment entered 
favor of Ringwood against Pqqqio. in •££*? 
7^ 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
.CONCUR: 
m> BiUtUi^iJ 
Judithjgf. BilLiftg*V Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the district 
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reversed in part/ in accordance with the views expressed in the 
opinion filed herein. 
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Richard W. Ringwood, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc. et al., 
Defendants and Respondents, 
Massimo MMaxM Poggio and Foreign 
Auto Works, Inc. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Hugh Gardner and Anthony R, 
Hernandez 
Defendants, 
Richard W. Ri 
Plaintiff 
v. 
Foreign Auto 
Defendant 
ngwood, 
and Respondent, 
Works, Inc. et al., 
s and Appellants. 
Massimo "Max" 
Auto Works, I 
Plaintiff 
v. 
Hugh Gardner 
Hernandez 
Defendant 
Poggio and Foreign 
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s and Appellants, 
and Anthony R. 
s and Respondents. 
Richard W. Ri 
Plaintiff 
Foreign Auto 
Defendant 
ngwood, 
and Respondent, 
Works, Inc. et al., 
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THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing be denied. 
Dated this pf1^^ day of January 1990. 
FOR THE COURT: 
j~ 'muQc
Mary T/ Noonan, C l e r k 
